Risk parameters
Each risk group runs in its own EUSDManager with its own parameters, and all four mint the same eUSD. Parameters are governance-set through the ProtocolRegistry role system. Values below are the onchain configuration on 1 November 2026; read the live values from each manager's riskParams().
Per risk group
| A: ETFs | B: ETH | C: Big tech | D: High growth | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collateral | SPY, QQQ, GLD | WETH | NVDA, META, GOOGL, AAPL, TSLA, AMZN | SPCX, MSTR, CRCL, MU, PLTR |
| Minimum collateral ratio | 150% | 200% | 175% | 200% |
| Max mint (share of value) | 66.7% | 50% | 57.1% | 50% |
| Liquidation threshold | 120% | 140% | 131.25% | 144% |
| Liquidation bonus | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
| Stability fee | 8% / year | 8% / year | 8% / year | 8% / year |
| Debt ceiling | 2,000,000 eUSD | 2,000,000 eUSD | 2,000,000 eUSD | 1,000,000 eUSD |
| Minimum debt | 100 eUSD | 100 eUSD | 100 eUSD | 100 eUSD |
| Price max age | 1 hour | 1 hour | 1 hour | 1 hour |
| Manager | 0xF9c9…cbF5 | 0xbd0A…2C2 | 0x6d49…Cc8C | 0x948d…d0e |
Riskier collateral needs more backing and liquidates earlier, so every group keeps the same cushion against a sudden move. The ceilings bound how much eUSD each group can create.
Setters
| Parameter | Setter |
|---|---|
| MCR, liquidation threshold, liquidation bonus | setRiskParams (requires MCR ≥ threshold ≥ 100% + bonus) |
| Stability fee | setStabilityFee (applies from the moment it is set) |
| Debt ceiling | setDebtCeiling (gates new mints only) |
| Minimum debt | setMinDebt |
| Price max age | setMintPriceMaxAge |
| Mint pause | setMintPaused (operator lever, per manager) |
| Collateral set | addCollateral / setCollateralEnabled |
Changing the minimum debt gates new state changes only; existing smaller positions are unaffected and a full close always works. Disabling a collateral stops new deposits and mints; exits are never gated.
How eUSD differs from Liquity
Same skeleton: overcollateralized CDPs, sorted-list riskiest-first redemption as the peg floor, hint-based insertion, value-neutral redemption math, keeper liquidations with surplus refund, and a minimum-debt dust guard. The real divergences:
| Area | Liquity v1 | eUSD |
|---|---|---|
| Collateral | ETH, 24/7 pricing | Stocks, ETFs and ETH in four risk groups, with signed prices outside market hours |
| Liquidations | Stability Pool with redistribution fallback | Direct keeper liquidation, partial liquidation supported |
| Fees | One-time borrow + redemption fees, floating baseRate | Zero mint and redemption fees, fixed 8%/yr stability fee to the treasury |
| Redemption payout | $1.00 minus a floating redemption fee | Exactly $1.00 of collateral per eUSD |
| MCR / liquidation | 110% / 110% | 150-200% / 120-144% |
| Minimum debt | ~2,000 LUSD | 100 eUSD |
| Governance | Fully immutable | Admin-configured parameters via ProtocolRegistry roles, no Recovery Mode |
| Multi-collateral | ETH only, forever | Per-collateral lists, one manager per risk group, like Liquity v2's branches |
| Bridging | Plain ERC-20 | ERC-7802 rails with per-bridge rate limits and a global net-bridged-in cap |
The trade-offs are deliberate. Zero-fee redemption gives a cleaner $1.00 floor but no fee damper against redemption cascades. Admin parameters make the system adaptable to stock collateral at the cost of a different trust model than Liquity's immutability; the levers are the debt ceilings, the mint pause, and per-collateral disable, and there is no Recovery Mode.